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compensate for the nutritional deficit that would
allegedly result from giving up meat and people,
especially those in developing countries, who cannot
fmd affordable nonmeat sources of protein would be
excused if vegetarianism would cause them more
suffering than is currently inflicted on the nonhuman
animals that they eat.
However, contrary to Wellington's claim that such
limitations on the argument for vegetarianism would
be "somewhat arbitrary," they are perfectly compatible
with a utilitarian approach. The most famous utilitarian
vegetarian of all, Peter Singer, concedes that his argument
may not apply to Eskimos, whose only available source
of protein is meat. 1 A consistent utilitarian must take
into account all relevant consequences, and, while it
may make the morality of meat eating more complex,
it is not at all arbitrary to recognize crucial differences
between men and women and between industrialized
and developing countries. The fact that utilitarianism
avoids blanket moral judgments that ignore vital
distinctions between different cases is one of its great
advantages as a moral theory.
A similar response applies to George's concern that
the utilitarian argument for vegetarianism would brand
women and inhabitants of developing countries as a
"moral underclass" of people who are unable to fulfill
the duty to be vegetarian. The key point is that
utilitarianism would impose no such duty in the first
place on any people for whom vegetarianism would be
unduly burdensome, in that their sacrifices in refraining
from eating meat would be greater than the harm
currently caused by their meat eating. Hence neither
women, poor people, nor inhabitants of developing
countries would be condemned to being unable to fulfIll
their moral duties, and the charge that the utilitarian
argument for vegetarianism serves only "the most
privileged class of humans" is unfounded.
So, even if George's empirical claims are supported
by the evidence, they do not undermine the utilitarian
case for vegetarianism. A utilitarian can consistently
relativize the duty to refrain from eating meat to those
on whom it would not impose an unfair burden.
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Alex Wellington has provided an invaluable survey of
feminist arguments for and against vegetarianism. My
utilitarian defense of vegetarianism was intended to
preclude neither rights-based nor feminist justifications.
Its goal, rather, was to show that the least controversial
ground for vegetarianism--{)ne that extends moral
concern to nonhumans on the basis of their ability to
suffer and feel pleasure-is sufficient to respond to two
well-known defenses of meat eating.
Whereas most of the feminist philosophers whom
Wellington discusses reach similar conclusions to those
ofmy utilitarian argument, or else disagree because they
reject traditional utilitarian or rights-based frameworks,
one of them-Kathryn Paxton George-raises an
objection that is directly relevant to my utilitarian case.
George argues that certain biological facts about women
and ecological and economic realities about the poor
and people who live in some developing countries
would make the demand that they become vegetarians
unfairly burdensome. If George has her empirical data
right, then, as Wellington correctly observes, utilitarian
advocates of vegetarianism may have to carve out wide
exceptions to the demand that we all become
vegetarians. Women who lack the resources to
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